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The study of sustainability in the economics literature has concentrated almost solely on 
macroeconomic considerations, with dynamic, economy-wide growth models 
demonstrating optimal paths of resource extraction and investment in order to generate 
final goods and productivity-augmenting capital stocks (Woodward and Bishop 2003; 
Solow 1974a,b; Hartwick 1977; Chichilnisky 1997; Asheim, Buchholz, and Tungodden 
2001). Under many sets of assumptions, it has been shown that these present-value 
optimizing paths result in declining instantaneous utility and/or consumption paths at 
some point during the planning horizon, suggesting that future generations may be worse 
off than those preceding them (see, for e.g., Dasgupta and Heal 1974, 1979; Solow 
1974b; Stiglitz 1974; Knapp 2004). Irreversibilities in the time dimension thus imply that 
actions taken by current generations will affect the opportunities of future generations 
through the endowments of resources left to the latter by the former.  
Precisely what is meant by “opportunities” is the subject of considerable debate, 
as assumptions about technology and the substitutability of resources can drastically 
affect the characterization of an economy as sustainable or not. Strict complementarities 
in production, for example, might imply preservation of a physical resource is required to 
sustain welfare opportunities, while increased substitution possibilities might imply that 
complete extraction of any given resource is not only feasible and optimal from a present 
value perspective, but also consistent with sustainable welfare paths. Furthermore, the 
very definition of which measure of welfare is to be sustained over what time period is 
contested, with suggestions ranging from the maintenance of the maximum long-run 
utility level (Chichilnisky’s Green Golden Rule, or GGR), to very strict notions of 
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intergenerational equity (Rawlsian maximin paths), to the maintenance of aggregate 
national wealth (accounting for externalities and resource depletion), to less strict 
definitions of non-declining utility (either instantaneous or summed over time) 
(Chichilnisky, Heal, and Beltratti 1995; Chichilnisky 1997; Solow 1974a,b, 1986; 
Hartwick 1990; Asheim 1994, 1997; Farzin 2002, 2004; Woodward 2000; Knapp 2004). 
While sustainable development at the global level is certainly of interest, many of 
these same concerns naturally extend to the sector level where most decisions about 
resource use are actually made (Woodward and Bishop 2003). At this level, however, 
there are often competing uses for a particular resource or set of resources, or incomplete 
property rights or markets result in external effects across sectors, resources, and 
stakeholders. Indeed, much of the non-economic literature on sustainable development 
seems particularly focused on broad issues of environmental degradation caused by 
otherwise productive uses of natural resources (see, for e.g., Tillman, et. al. 2002). This 
paper addresses these sector-level concerns by investigating the ramifications of 
alternative interpretations of agricultural sustainability on a simple dynamic model of an 
agroecosystem with externalities. Using numerical dynamic programming techniques, the 
present value problem of maximizing the discounted sum of instantaneous welfare over 
time is amended by imposing alternative sustainability constraints, each implying a 
particular definition of intergenerational equity for a subset of agents. Retention of the 
assumption of maximization behavior allows for considerations of efficiency as well. 
A General Sector Model with Externalities 
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Consider a model in which there are two vectors of resources, 
1 N
t + ∈ℜ x and 
2 N
t + ∈ℜ z , 
which are sources of (dis)utility, either directly (through immediate consumption) or 
indirectly (using the resource as an input into a production process). There are two 
sectors for each generation t: the first sector chooses controls  ( ) t C t ∈ cx
1 to achieve 
instantaneous utility u , while the second sector is passive (in the sense that they 
make no controlling choices in the model) and derives utility 
( , ) t t cx
( , ) tt ν xz from each of the 
stocks. For example, the first sector could represent a firm or collection of firms involved 
in transforming the resource vector  into a final good (e.g., mining or agriculture), 
while the second sector derives utility from this final good or the resource stock itself, but 
is negatively affected by a (related) stock of pollution  for example, a subset of 
individuals engaged in non-consumptive water recreation in a small lake. Each stock 
evolves according to the equations of motion 
t x
; t z


















2 ~( , iid ) ε µσ  an instantaneous shock to  that is realized after the control 
decisions are made.
t x
2 Note that the choices of the active sector affect future representative 
agents’ utility, but the effects of the choices on  do not directly enter his utility function. 
In addition, we assume the evolution of  is only indirectly influenced by the stochastic 
shock through choice of controls. In other words,   are disjoint in the sense that 
the evolution of each of the stocks does not depend on the stock of the other. The linkage 
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albeit in possibly different ways. This specification is appropriate when analyzing the 
effects of the actions of “upstream” agents on “downstream” agents, such as a farm that 
uses a soil resource for production purposes, but in so doing pollutes a waterway 
downstream that is used for recreation.  
Assuming that each generation of the active agent has property rights over  and 










= ∑ cx 01 , ρ < <
p
t
,  private welfare can be recursively defined as 
  1 () () m a x  (,) ( ) ,
tt
p
tt t t C Vu E V ρ + ∈
⎡ ⎤ =+ ⎣ ⎦ cx xc xx  (2) 
subject to (1), while if the externality were internalized, the social planner’s solution 
could be defined as 
  11 () (,) m a x  (,) (,) ( , ) ,
tt
ss
tt tt tt t t t C Vu v E V ρ ++ ∈
⎡ ⎤ =+ + ⎣ ⎦ cx xz cx xz x z  (3) 
subject to (1). Note that the decision rule for the private solution and social solution will 
differ due to the dependence of  1 t+ z on   This model is similar to the one described in 
Woodward (2000), except that a stock externality is explicitly incorporated into the 
specification. We next turn to amending these utilitarian problems with sustainability 
constraints. 
. t c
Sustainability Constrained Models 
One of the key contributions of this paper is to characterize paths of development under 
alternative interpretations of the concept of sustainability. We begin by assuming that 
sustainability implies some degree of intergenerational equity, or “fairness”,  in resource 
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allocations across time, but vary the assumptions about what exactly is to be sustained 
(physical stocks, alternative interpretations of welfare) to explore the consequences of 
these alternative interpretations. As such, sustainability in whatever incarnation is 
represented by a constraint on the present-value optimizing problem discussed in section 
2, rather than redefinition of the objective of the maximizing agent.  More specifically, 
the sustainability constraints used here will take the form 
  [ ] [ ] 111 (,,) ( , , ) , tt t t tt t t Ef Ef +++ ≤ cxz c x z  (4) 
where the expectation is taken with respect to the information available in time t.
3 In this 
sense, we assume that a benevolent social planner has restricted the choice set via a self-
imposed constraint, as discussed in Sen (1997). A discussion of this assumption can be 
found in Bond (2006), which summarizes the “pro” arguments of Woodward (2000) and 
Sen (1997), and the “con” arguments of Dasgupta and Mäler (1994) and Knapp (2004). 
We recognize that constraints of the form (4) are not unique in representing a 
sustainability concept, and that alternative specifications could be justified on many 
different grounds. Nevertheless, as the purpose of the analysis is to explore the 
implications of alternative interpretations of intergenerational equity according to what 
exactly is to be sustained over generations, we maintain the expected value formulation 
as a reasonable representation of a self-imposed obligation to succeeding generations.  
  An additional consideration is the extent to which allocations over time can be 
considered “fair”. For example, a minimum standard type of criterion would allow time 
paths of some measure of interest to decline over some sub-interval of the planning 
horizon, so long as it remained above a predefined threshold, and still be consistent with 
   7
sustainability. Similarly, a Green Golden Rule type of criterion would not necessarily 
preclude any path that converged to the GGR solution in the long run, regardless of 
intergenerational distribution. Here, however, we follow both Woodward (2000) and 
Knapp (2004) and define criteria which assume non-declining paths between consecutive 
generations, disallowing a declining path at any point over the planning horizon.
4 
Woodward (2000) shows that such a constraint, when combined with the assumption of 
each generation behaving in an analogous way with respect to welfare, results in “fair” 
distributions in which future generations do not envy the present.  
We focus on two specific forms of (4), each of which implicitly embodies 
assumptions about the opportunities available to future generations. A strong 
sustainability constraint assumes that future opportunity is directly linked to resource 
stocks, so that “fairness” implies 
  [ ] 1 tt t E + ≤ qq  (5) 
where  [ ] , tt ∈ qx z t is a (sub)vector of the resource stocks in the model. Depending on the 
sector(s) of interest, constraint (5) might include any number of stocks in either resource 
vector, and there may be no admissible solutions that satisfy the constraint. Furthermore, 
even if a solution exists, the expected value framework does not guarantee that each 
succeeding generation will actually be at least as endowed as the preceding one, as 
stochastic realizations of  t ε may result in  1 . t + t < qq Nevertheless, the expectations 
framework presents a means of mathematically representing a concern for future 
generations (at least in terms of the first moment of a stochastic distribution) based on the 
best information available at the time of the control choice (Woodward 2000).
5   
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  Rather than sustaining expected physical stocks (akin to the “strong” 
sustainability concept), economics has tended to focus on intergenerational equity in 
consumption or utility across time as measures of economic opportunity (Solow 1974a,b 
Hartwick 1977). Following this lead, we consider a representation of sustainability based 
on Woodward’s (2000, 2003) interpretation of intergenerational welfare, also advocated 
by Arrow, Dasgupta, and Mäler (2003). We assume instantaneous welfare for the private 
problem, in which externalities are not taken into account when choosing the controls, is 




ttt tt Uu = cxz cx
(,,) (,) (,)
S
ttt tt tt Uu ν =+ cxz cx xz
6 Depending on the problem under consideration, we 
define each generations’ welfare as the discounted sum of the infinite stream of utility 







= ∑ cxz. Realizing that we have written 
this measure recursively for each problem in (2) and (3), the sustainability constraint in 
terms of non-decreasing welfare over time can thus be written 
  11 (,) ( , )
jj
tt t t t VE V ++ ⎡ ⎤ ≤ ⎣ ⎦ xz x z  (6) 
where  is the value function for each constrained optimization problem. Note that (6) 
does generally allow for declining instantaneous utility over some portion of the planning 
horizon, but explicitly incorporates the utility of future generations into the welfare 
specification (Knapp 2004). Clearly, the set of admissible paths that satisfy each 
constraint will likely differ, highlighting the importance of a multi-sector specification in 
sustainability analysis. 
j V
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  Each sustainability constrained problem is thus defined as a present value 
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cxz c x z
 (7) 
where   is the value function for each constrained problem. Depending on the specific 
form of the sustainability constraint, there may not be a solution to (7); if there is, 
however, the problem can be solved using numerical techniques (Judd 1998). The 
specification in (7) provides the framework for analyzing sustainable outcomes in a two 
sector framework in which one sector imposes a stock externality on the other.
j V
7 While 
many specific problems fit into this general framework, the application presented here 
will concentrate on the conflict between the agricultural sector (as the active sector with 
soil stocks   and fertilizer input use  ) and a passive, non-consumptive downstream 
sector (say, water-based recreation) that is damaged by this sectors’ input use. The results 
highlight the importance of including sectoral linkages in analyses of problems where 
intergenerational equity is of interest, and the need for policy makers to explicitly 
characterize the goals of “sustainable” systems. 
t x t c
Agroecosystem Model Specification 
The basic present-value agroecosystem model used for this analysis is the discrete time 
analog of the model presented in Bond (2006). Omitting many of the details here, the 
   10
model includes a mass-balance representation of productive land and the cycle of a crop-
limiting nutrient, generalized from Baisden and Amundson (2003), with an additional 
state variable representing environmental damage from the use of inorganic inputs. These 
resources evolve according to the following equations: 
  1 1 11 1t 12 2 13 3 (1 ) tt t NN N F γ a t m α αα α γ γ + =− + + + +  (8) 
  21 2 1 1 2 2 2 (1 ) tt NN t N α α + = +−  (9) 
  1 (1 ) , tt t X XF δ η + = −+  (10) 
where   and  are annual and decadal nutrient pools, respectively, that represent 
nutrient cycling behavior, 
1 N 2 N
X is the stock of pollution,  is an index of inorganic fertilizer 
used as an input into the production system, 
F
atm γ  and  3 γ are exogenous nutrient deposits 
from the atmosphere and the millennial nutrient pool (assumed constant here), and the 
remaining parameters ( , ,  ,  and  ij γ α αδ η ) govern the behavior of the dynamic system. 
Technology is assumed constant, and yields are a function of the perfectly substitutable 
indigenous nutrients and inorganic fertilizer inputs, so that 
 We assume two representative agents 
in the model: a producer whose utility depends on profit derived from yields and fertilizer 
use, such that   and a representative consumer of non-productive 
environmental services damaged by fertilizer use such that 
() 11 22 0, 0, 0. tt t F t YfN N F f f βββ β ′′ ′ =+ + + > <
t c F ,
P
tt t Up Y π == −
( ), 0, 0. t vg Xg g ′′ ′ = ≤≤  For 
simplicity, we assume a risk-neutral producer who is not directly affected by 
environmental damage. Instantaneous social welfare is assumed separable and defined as 
   11
the sum of the welfare of the representative agents such that  .
S
tt U t π ν = +  Note that this 
specification implicitly assumes that the change in consumer surplus as a result of 
changes in agricultural output equals zero. A sufficient condition for this interpretation is 
that the productive agricultural agent is small relative to the overall market, and changes 
in production do not affect market prices for the agricultural good (i.e., perfect 
competition in the agricultural market). As such, the model is most appropriate when 
viewed in the context of a small region (for example, either one or a small group of 
homogenous producers whose production negatively affects a neighborhood or 
community recreation resource). In certain cases, the geographical interpretation may be 
broadened, but with special attention to the homogeneity of the land resource. 
Furthermore, we assume for simplicity that initial environmental damage is scaled to be 
zero at time t=0, and we focus on the intensive, rather than extensive, margin. 
  The use of numerical analysis requires specific functional forms for the yield and 
utility functions, as well as parameter values for the biogeochemical model and these 
functions. A Spillman-Mitscherlich yield function of the form  ( )
() 1,
s bN YA e
− =−  widely 
used in agronomic research, is assumed for the yield function, with 
s N representing the 
linear combination of state and control variables that comprise nutrient availability 
(Lanzer, Paris, and Williams 1987; Frank, Beattie, and Ernbleton 1990; Llewelyn and 
Featherstone 1997; Kastens, Schmitdt, and Dhuyvetter 2003).
8 The function exhibits 
diminishing returns in the nutrient over the domain of  s N , and asymptotes at 
parameter A with curvature determined by parameter   The utility function for the  . b
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representative consumer affected by the externality is assumed to be a simple quadratic of 
the form 
2. dX ν =−  All parameters take on the values in Table 1 unless otherwise 
indicated. 
  One key advantage of the numerical specification is the ease to which one can 
introduce uncertainty into the analysis. In the case of the agroecosystem model, a primary 
source of uncertainty is the atmospheric deposition of the limiting nutrient from year to 
year, , atm γ  due to variations in weather. Randomness in this parameter directly affects the 
growth of the active pool, and indirectly affects the other stocks, yields, and profits 
through the cycling behavior and input choice. For the stochastic simulations below, it is 
assumed that   making the active pool a controlled Markov process.  (
2 ~2 0 , 5 atm N γ ) ,
  In addition to estimating the present value solution, we consider the sustainability-
constrained problems for both the private and social models. Strong sustainability for the 
private model could be represented in a number of ways depending on one’s assumption 
about the intergenerational obligation with regard to each nutrient stock; however, we 
take as an example the constraint 
  [ ] 11 , tt t NE N + ≤ 1  (11) 
as the active pool is the primary source of soil nutrients and is likely highly correlated 
with available soil test measures. In the social model, we would ideally like to preserve 
both the productive capacity of the soil and the initial level of damage to the 
environmental resource.
9 However, augmentation of the nutrient stocks through fertilizer 
use will increase environmental damage, and thus there are likely no admissible paths for 
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which   and (11) are both satisfied. 1 ( tt XE X + ≥ )
10 Thus, the sustainability problem 
becomes one of trading off endowments not only between successive generations, but 
current generations as well.  
  Feasible solutions do exist, however, when welfare, rather than physical stocks, is 
the object of the sustainability criterion, but tradeoffs in welfare between current 
generations are still necessary.
11 Sustaining welfare (in the sense of (2) or (3), as opposed 
to instantaneous utility) for the agricultural sector requires 
  ( ) ( ) 2 1 12 1 1 12 1 (, , ) , , ,
PP
tt t t t t t t F N N V NN E V NN πρ ++ ++ ⎡ ⎤ +≤ ⎣ ⎦  (12) 




12 1 1 2 1
11 21 1
(, , ) ( ) , ,
,, ,
S
tt t t t t
S
tt t t
t F NN v X V N N X




⎡ ⎤ ≤ ⎣ ⎦
 (13) 
in accordance with (6). Again, while (12) is essentially a problem of intergenerational 
allocation within one sector, taking the externality into account involves substitutions 
between sectors as well. We wish to characterize the optimal paths of the solution to each 
constrained problem relative to the PV-optimal solution, and examine the welfare 
tradeoffs involved with each.  
Numerical Dynamic Programming Approach 
Numerical solutions to the dynamic programming specification require estimation of the 
continuous value function   in (7) for each problem under consideration. We follow 




12 In short, this method utilizes the Contraction Mapping property of 
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the value function, which assures convergence of each successive approximation of the 
value function  where  is a mapping function (Howitt, et al. 2003). The 
problem under consideration here is either two dimensional if only private welfare is 
considered, but three-dimensional in the case of the multiple sector specification. 
Illustrating the three dimensional problem, a Chebyshev polynomial functional form of 
each of the approximated functions is used and is defined by 




  ( ) ( ) ( )( )
12
12 ˆ ,, ( ) () ( ) ijk i j k
ij k
GN N X a MN MN MX φφ φ = , ∑ ∑∑  (14) 
 where  ( ) M ⋅ transforms each state variable to the [1 , 1 ] −  interval,  m φ  is the m
th term 
( )of the polynomial defined by  1,..., m = M ( )
1 () c o s c o s () m z m φ
− =⋅ z , and the  are the 
coefficients to be estimated (Judd 1998; Howitt, et al. 2003).
ijk a
13 In practice, the 
coefficients for the deterministic problem are obtained by evaluating (14) at a user-









− ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 for  1,..., nN = and  , 
then regressing these values on the 
1 NM ≥+
m φ  (Judd, 1998; Howitt, et al. 2003). For the 
stochastic representation, the expected function is found by taking a discrete 
approximation of the underlying continuous distribution of the random variable, then 
calculating the probability-weighted sum of the functions evaluated at each of these 
discrete points.  
Optimal Present Value Solutions 
Deterministic and stochastic estimations of the unconstrained (PV-optimal) solution with 
only producer welfare taken into account during the optimization are shown in Figure 1 
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for various nutrient stock initial conditions, and assuming zero initial damage.
14 The 
certainty equivalent solutions are shown as solid lines, while a particular stochastic 
realization for each initial value is represented by the dashed line. Introducing risk into 
the analysis does not substantially change the qualitative conclusions about the PV-
optimal paths, but does introduce noise into the system, and results in a steady state 
distribution for each variable, rather than a particular steady state level. 
  Consistent with the analysis in Bond (2006), low initial nutrient stocks imply high 
fertilizer use in the short run, while high initial values result in an optimal fertilization 
path that is gradually increasing over time. Note that the presence of the decadal pool N2 
and the assumed unidirectional flow of the nutrients through the model, as well as the 
irreversibilities in investment, result in an asymmetry in response between these cases, 
with fertilization rapidly approaching the steady state level in the former as stocks are 
built up quickly, while the relatively gradual depletion of the decadal stock with high 
initial nutrient levels results in a more gradually increasing fertilization path. The higher 
is the initial value of N1, the lower is short run fertilization, with little effect on rate of 
convergence to the steady state. A higher initial N2, however, results in both lower short-
run fertilization as well as a longer rate of convergence to the steady state. This translates 
into profit paths that rapidly increase to the steady state in the case of severely degraded 
initial soil, but gradually decreasing profit paths in the case of relatively undisturbed land. 
  As seen in Figure 2, optimizing over social welfare through internalization of the 
externality has the expected effects of lowering input use at all points over the planning 
horizon, including the steady state. As a result, steady-state levels of both the active and 
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decadal pools are lower, as is steady-state environmental damage. In essence, private 
profits are thus traded off with increased social welfare. It is important to note, however, 
that internalization of the externality in a Pareto-efficient manner does not automatically 
result in intergenerationally equitable welfare paths for either of the two sectors, nor for 
society as a whole. Profits are slowly declining over the planning horizon before reaching 
the steady state, damage is monotonically increasing to the steady state, and social 
welfare thus declines as well. Thus, internalization of an externality does not result in 
sustainable welfare paths under any of the criteria examined in this paper, but does, of 
course, improve resource allocation efficiency in the presence of the externality. We 
postpone analysis of the intergenerational equity effects of externality internalization 
until section 9, after presenting the results of the sustainability-constrained solutions. 
Strong Sustainability Solutions 
We next turn to the sustainability constrained solutions to explore the tradeoffs of 
following a sustainability optimal path, beginning with a representation of a “strong 
sustainability” solution in which physical stocks, rather than welfare flows, are sustained. 
For the private problem, this implies maintaining active pool nutrient stock levels 
between subsequent time periods, although the distribution of the total stock through the 
two pools can differ. Alternatively, one could sustain a non-increasing path of damage for 
the sector affected by the externality, at the expense of agricultural production. As noted 
previously, the parameterization of the problem ensures that there are no admissible paths 
for which both of these conditions can be satisfied; as such, the paths described below 
can be interpreted as the bounds on the continuum of strongly sustainable criteria.  
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  Strong sustainability paths that maintain active nutrient stocks, and thus satisfy 
constraint (11), for the private model are shown in Figure 3, and are termed N1-
Sustainable (N1-sus).
1516 As the PV-optimal solution exhibits an “overshooting” 
characteristic due to the presence of the decadal pool when initial stocks are low (i.e., the 
ending stock in the first period is greater than the steady state), the constraint binds at 
most stock levels. As such, the optimal N1-Sus control strategy is to maintain active pool 
stock levels at approximately the PV steady state level for the entire planning horizon, 
while the decadal pool stocks gradually adjust to some new, non-unique steady-state level 
which is increasing in the initial stocks. If initial stocks in each pool are greater than the 
PV-optimal steady state, then these levels are maintained over the entire planning horizon 
through fertilization levels greater than the PV-optimal solution. 
  While the solutions to this problem ensure that subsequent generations of 
producers in the active sector are endowed with at least the same physical resource stocks 
as the preceding one, this does not guarantee either non-declining welfare paths over time 
nor that the welfare of later generations is enhanced relative to the PV-optimal solution.  
In fact, because maintenance of the resource is costly and the marginal benefits are small 
due to concavity of the yield function, the value function   is negatively 
sloped with respect to    for active pool stock levels greater than the PV-optimal level, 











 is the current value shadow price of  the negative slope 
implies that additional soil nutrients are negatively valued, and welfare could be 
increased by “mining” the soil through reduced fertilizer applications. Because this is 
, k N
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inconsistent with the sustainability constraint, however, the optimal strongly sustainable 
solution results in declining and lower steady-state profit levels than the PV-optimal 
solution, and increased fertilization rates results in greater damage to the resource used by 
the passive sector, resulting in severely downward sloping paths of social welfare and 
low levels of steady-state social utility. Physically sustaining the productive capacity of 
the soil at these high levels, then, is directly at odds with the economic goals of the 
producer in both the short and long runs, as would be expected a priori with a positive 
discount rate. 
  If, on the other hand, the resource used by the passive sector is to be preserved, 
the strong sustainability constraint can be written as 
  1, tt X X + ≥  (15) 
and assuming  the only feasible solution to either the private or social problem is 
to set   We term these paths X-sustainable (X-sus). As such, private and social 
welfare are equal with paths determined entirely by the initial stocks of the nutrients, as 
shown in Figure 5. While this sustains both the resource, and therefore utility, of the 
passive sector, any initial stock values above the zero fertilizer steady-state result in 
declining nutrient stocks and thus declining profits and social welfare over the planning 
horizon. Furthermore, steady state profits and social welfare in the long run are lower 
than the social PV-optimal solution, and this inefficiency does not result in more 
equitable welfare paths over time. 
0 0, X =
0  . t F =∀ t
Value Sustainability Solutions 
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Solutions to the private and social problems that interpret the obligation between 
generations as one of non-declining welfare streams consistent with (12) are presented in 
Figures 6 and 7, respectively, and termed value sustainable (V-sus).  According to 
Assumption B in Woodward (2000), a sufficient condition to ensure a solution to (7) with 
the value sustainability constraint is the existence of some control such that a lower 
bound on instantaneous welfare can be reached for any values of the states; in other 
words, a free disposability assumption. In the case of the agroecosystem model, this 
assumption is satisfied if one assumes that revenue in the active sector can be “wasted”, 
particularly when initial nutrient stocks are high.
17 In the numerical simulations, this is 
accomplished by adding a non-negative multiplicative control variable to active sector 
revenues that takes on a value less than one if revenues are wasted, but equal to one 
otherwise. Woodward (2000) terms the former “stepwise inefficiency”, and it is 
characterized by the ability to increase the welfare of the generation in time t without 
adversely affecting the subsequent generation in t+1, but only by violating the 
sustainability constraint. In the analysis that follows, we assume that the Pareto-superior 
choice is chosen by the actor, and the welfare streams that are reported assume that the 
generation in t keeps, rather than disposes of, any revenue that must be discarded in order 
to satisfy the sustainability constraint.  
  Qualitatively, the paths of the state and control variables for the private V-sus 
solution are very similar to the PV-optimal solution, despite the fact that the sustainability 
constraint is binding at a minimum of one point for each path shown.
18 As seen in Figure 
8, the value function for the PV-optimal solution is monotonically increasing in each 
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stock, with the marginal value of each additional unit of stock independent of the stock 
level.  In the value constrained problem, however, this is only true up to a point, as the 
value function is restricted from above at  /(1 )
P
value S π ρ = − , where π  is the maximum 
profit level that can be maintained for an infinite time period.
 19 Thus, the shadow value 
of additional nutrients is state-dependent: constant and positive for relatively low stock 
levels, but zero for higher stock levels. Note, however, that these values are defined in 
terms of the future value of the optimal path, and do not include the additional value for 
the current generation that can be appropriated (through not disposing of profits) from 
choosing the Pareto-optimal solution as a result of the stepwise inefficiency. 
  In accordance with Figure 8, the major difference in the optimal paths between 
the PV-optimal and V-sus solutions occur when stocks are high relative to the PV-
optimal steady state level. For example, Figure 9 shows the optimal fertilization schedule 
and total N stocks for selected years beginning with initial stocks of (140,140). Overall, 
both paths are described by increasing fertilizer use compensating for the removal of 
indigenous nutrients that occurs from harvesting and leaching as a result of cultivation. 
As suggested in the previous section, it is neither necessary nor optimal to sustain the 
physical nutrient stocks to maintain welfare between generations, and due to the stepwise 
inefficiencies, it is actually optimal for stock levels in early time periods for the 
constrained problem to be less than the PV-opt levels, accompanied by lower fertilization 
rates. In the long run, however, this pattern is reversed, and the sustainable steady state 
level is slightly higher than the PV solution, as defined by . Of course, in order to 
maintain these stocks, a higher fertilization level is required, which in turn results in 
P
value V
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greater steady-state damage in a social sense. This runs counter to many claims that 
reduced fertilizer use is consistent with sustainable outcomes (e.g., Rigby, et al. 2001).  
  In many cases, however, these claims are likely due to the external damage 
caused by what may be perceived as excessive fertilizer use that affects primarily 
downstream assets. The social value sustainability problem admits paths that preserve 
opportunity in the sense of (13) with  , i.e., the utility of 
both the active and passive sector is recognized and the welfare of all successive 
generations is recognized in the sustainability constraint. Recall that internalization of the 
externality is not sufficient to sustain social welfare over time, so that additional tradeoffs 
between both sectors and generations are necessary. 
2 (,,,)
s
tttt t t Up Y c F ε =− − cxz d X
  In contrast to the PV-optimal social solution, which prescribes a fertilization 
strategy that provides for gradually declining nutrient availability over time as damage 
grows (as indicated through declining profit levels with relatively stable fertilization 
rates), the social V-sus solution presented in Figure 7 is to gradually increase nutrient 
availability from relatively low levels over the intermediate time periods, providing the 
opportunity for subsequent generations of producers to obtain higher yields (and profits). 
This is similar to the finding in Woodward (2000) that value sustainable extraction in a 
renewable resource economy is associated with growth in the resource stock.
20 It should 
be noted, however, that this growth follows a small number of adjustment periods during 
which fertilization levels that are greater than the new steady state are optimal. This odd 
result occurs as a result of the low level of initial damage assumed, and the fact that 
utility for the passive sector is decreasing and concave in the stock of damage. As such, 
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fertilization can be used at low damage levels without significantly decreasing the 
welfare of future generations, allowing the productive sector to reap the benefits. At 
sufficiently high stocks of nutrients, stepwise inefficiencies might occur as well.
21 As the 
externality accumulates and the nutrient balances in the soil adjust according to the 
dynamics of the natural system, higher levels of fertilization more severely degrade the 
welfare of future generations, and the optimal solution is to gradually increase 
fertilization rates. Thus, for intermediate levels of damage below the steady state, a social 
V-sus solution is characterized by lower fertilizer use than the PV-optimal solution, but 
this level actually increases over time. 
  Another key result of interest is the tradeoff between sectors as a result of the 
imposition of this particular form of intergenerational equity. In the absence of stepwise 
inefficiencies, the social utility path has a slope of essentially zero, much like the 
profitability path in the private problem, and is very close in value to the corresponding 
steady state level in the present value problem. In essence, then, social utility is 
maintained by exactly balancing the growth in the disutility of the passive sector with the 
growth in the profitability of the productive sector. Thus, even in the presence of an 
externality, an intergenerationally equitable path from the standpoint of society as a 
whole can be characterized by increasing producer profits and damage of the sector 
affected by the externality, albeit the latter occurs at a lower growth rate than in the PV-
optimal solution.  
Welfare Implications of S-Optimal Solutions 
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In this section, we further examine the welfare implications of following the sustainable 
paths as compared to the standard PV-optimal solutions for each problem under 
consideration. As the sum of discounted welfare is bounded from above by the present 
value solution, following any of the sustainable paths will necessitate a loss of total 
welfare (defined as the discounted sum of instantaneous utility streams) in any case in 
which a sustainability constraint binds. However, the distribution of this loss across 
generations and/or sectors is generally not known a priori, though either physical 
endowments or overall instantaneous utility are guaranteed to be non-decreasing over 
time. 
  Figure 10 shows the total value of the optimal solutions over the infinite planning 
horizon, with the values for the private problem representing total discounted profits, 
while the social solution values show the discounted sum of overall social utility.
22 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the private problem graph is that with the exception 
of the X-sus solution (which severely restricts the ability of the productive agricultural 
sector to generate profits), overall value is very similar across solutions. Differences are 
most severe in the case of high initial stocks, suggesting that policy intervention on 
behalf of satisfying a given sustainability constraint would be most justified in cases such 
as a previously unexploited (or underexploited) resource. When an externality is taken 
into account, however, the differences between the PV-optimal and value sustainable 
solutions are magnified.  
  Figure 11 partially decomposes these welfare measures by examining the 
intergenerational and intersector variation of these utility differences for the first, fifth, 
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tenth, twentieth, and fortieth generations, with relatively high initial stocks such that any 
sustainability constraint will be binding at some point during the planning horizon. In 
contrast to Figure 10, however, the gains from stepwise inefficiencies are taken into 
account. From the figure, it is clear that sustaining physical stocks is not only inefficient, 
as there is at least one option for each sector which would be preferred by every 
generation, but it can also be more inequitable than the preferred choice. In the private 
sector, profits for the private V-sus solution are higher than those for N1-sus, with the 
inequality between the first and subsequent periods a result of stepwise inefficiencies 
(recall that the steady-state profits for this problem are π ). In terms of social welfare, 
sustaining the high initial soil nutrient stocks results in far greater disutility for the 
passive sector over the long run than the other potential paths, while limiting damage to 
zero results in high passive sector utility only at great expense to the productive sector. 
Neither solution is as equitable across both sectors as even the PV-soc result. 
  Several other interesting points can be made from the figure. First, if an 
unregulated productive sector (such that the externality was not taken into account) made 
the decision to follow a sector-specific value sustainable policy (V-sus private) to 
enhance intergenerational equity, private profits will be slightly greater than the PV-
optimal solution in the long run, but the resultant social welfare path favors earlier 
generations over later ones. Second, as already noted, internalization of the externality 
does not result in intergenerationally equitable welfare paths for either sector, nor in total. 
In fact, it actually increases the disparity in profit levels across generations of producers. 
However, equitability increases in the passive sector, and the resultant social welfare 
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paths decline by only 21% from the first to fortieth generation, as opposed to the 92% 
under the private PV-optimal solution. 
  Finally, it is interesting to note that the value sustainability solution for the social 
problem (V-Sus Soc) results in only slightly greater social utility in the fortieth 
generation than the corresponding PV-optimal solution, but does so though a reallocation 
of overall social utility from intermediate to later generations. In this sense, the solution 
to the sustainability-constrained problem bears similarities to that of a PV-optimal 
solution with a relatively lower discount rate.
23 The analogy is not perfect, however, as 
the V-sus solution results in gradually increasing, rather than decreasing, profit paths 
over time, unlike the PV-opt (or any other) solution. 
Conclusions 
Sustainability is an oft-cited resource and environmental management goal in policy 
circles around the globe, despite a multiplicity of meanings across individuals, 
disciplines, or problems. While it may be desirable to maintain or increase economic 
vitality, environmental quality, and intergenerational equity across all future generations, 
doing so may impose significant costs on the present or even future generations, or may 
even be impossible. On the other hand, in some cases a sustainable solution may be 
identical (or, at the least, very close) to the standard present-value welfare maximizing 
paradigm commonly assumed in economics. 
  This paper illustrates some of these issues in the context of a simple dynamic 
model of agriculture with an externality. We assume that the agricultural sector chooses 
inputs (fertilizer) that directly contribute to crop growth and indirectly contribute to the 
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quality of the soil (nutrient levels), but that runoff and leaching pollutes a downstream 
sector in the form of a stock externality. Without taking the pollution into account, the 
present value solution results in increasing profitability and nutrient stocks over time for 
low initial stocks, but the converse for a relatively high initial endowment. Social 
welfare, defined as the sum of utility from both sectors, declines in both cases. 
Internalization of the externality results in a more equitable social welfare distribution 
over time, but at the expense of the profitability and equitability of the agricultural sector. 
  Two sustainability criteria were analyzed: a “strong” constraint that maintains 
physical stocks over time, and a “value” constraint that ensures that future generations’ 
welfare is non-decreasing over time. A key result is that physically sustaining a particular 
resource is not a necessary condition for sustaining welfare, nor does sustaining welfare 
require maintenance of any particular stock. In fact, in many cases, physically sustaining 
a stock is not only Pareto-dominated by other feasible paths, but also results in a less 
equal distribution of welfare across generations. 
    In the specific case examined here, the PV-optimal solution to the private 
problem results in a fairly equitable distribution of profits over time, although the 
existence of stepwise inefficiencies due to the fact that the value function is bounded 
from above allows for earlier generations to enjoy higher profit levels than those that 
follow. Although this violates the sustainability constraint, it is Pareto improving, and 
thus future generations would have no reason to object were they able to do so. From a 
social perspective, the value sustainable solution results in an equitable distribution of 
total welfare over time (again, except for stepwise inefficiencies), but implies a relatively 
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slow rate of growth (rather than decline) in the agricultural sectors’ profits coupled with a 
slow decrease in utility for the passive sector. The trade-off, however, is that profits for 
each generation under the value sustainable solution are less than the social planners’ PV-
optimal solution (as well as the private PV-optimal solution), but the disutility generated 
by the externality is also reduced. Hence, the value sustainability constraint in the 
presence of an externality essentially acts as a welfare transfer mechanism from the 
productive to the passive sector, especially in the short to medium run, but also induces a 
type of deadweight loss in that the discounted sum of social welfare is lower than that 
under a present value criterion. 
  The results of this paper highlight the fact that many dynamic resource allocation 
problems may involve multi-dimensional tradeoffs between contemporaneous resource-
consuming sectors, tradeoffs between subsequent generations in the same sector, and 
tradeoffs between actors in different sectors in different time periods. As scientists, policy 
makers, and the larger society as a whole debate the extent of the obligation of the 
present generation towards those in the future, the economics discipline can contribute by 
using models and techniques such as these to inform others about the relative costs and 
benefits of each potential choice. 
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Footnotes 
t () t x
{
1 It is assumed that c is piecewise continuous and that the control set C is defined as 
} () : (,)0 , 1
k
tt t t Ch k K =≥ = … xc x c
0.
for any K time-invariant inequality constraints on the control (Caputo 
2005).  
2 A deterministic specification is a special case of the problem considered here, and would result from 
assuming  µ σ ==
 
We note here that the incorporation of stochastic shocks is a) relatively simple in a 
dynamic programming, as opposed to an analytical optimal control, framework in most cases; b) more 
realistic from the standpoint of a decision maker, in that future values of the state variables will not likely 
be known with certainty; and c) is of general interest in the sustainability literature (Woodward, 2000).   
3 Note that each time period t is implicitly associated with a generation and a particular value of the control 
variable, and that the stochastic shock is realized after the choice decision ct is made.  
4 The authors differ in their definitions of what is to be sustained, however. In addition, as discussed below, 
the presence of a particular type of inefficiency may result in declining welfare paths if present generations 
are assumed to retain utility that would otherwise have to be disposed. 
5 If resiliency issues were particularly relevant for a given problem, constraints involving higher order 
moments might be in order. Note that there is nothing inherent in the framework thus far that precludes a 
utilitarian problem from being “sustainable” in the sense that the constraint is not binding. 
6 The additive framework is justified by the fact that the first-order conditions for a Pareto efficient 
allocation of resources between representative agents can be represented as a weighted sum of utilities 
(Varian, 1992). Implicit welfare weights can be changed through alternative parameterizations of the 
instantaneous utility functions. 
7 In this context, a stock externality is particularly interesting in that the damage persists between 
generations, rather than simply affecting the present. A flow externality could easily be incorporated by 
adding a term reflecting the increased contemporaneous damage (i.e., decrease in instantaneous utility) as a 
result of the external effects. 
8 This functional form can easily incorporate additional factors of production as well. 
9 Recall that we have normalized initial damage to zero for the purposes of analysis. 
10 The parameters of the model are chosen such that a positive level of fertilizer is optimal in the long run 
for the unconstrained problem. Note that since X is a source of disutility, the inequality is reversed. 
11 As discussed later in the paper, an assumption of free disposability might be necessary to ensure a 
solution to the value sustainable problems. 
12 Estimation of the value function alone has been termed “value iteration”, while estimation algorithms 
that include an approximation of the policy function has been termed “policy iteration” (Judd, 1998; 
Howitt, et al., 2003). 
13 As the state space expands, the dimensionality of the polynomials quickly becomes unruly. As such, we 
use an M=15 degree polynomial in each dimension for the private, 2-state problem, and M=9 for the social, 
3-state problem. Programming was done in using the GAMS modeling system, with varying run times 
ranging from just over one hour to several days for the 9 coefficient, 3 state function. 
14 For illustrative purposes, results are presented for initial (N1, N2, X) stock levels of (20, 20, 0), (60, 60, 
0), (100,100, 0), and (140, 140, 0). 
15 The introduction of risk in the strong sustainability case presented numerical difficulties as estimation of 
the value function at high stock levels with high realizations of the stochastic inflow requires evaluation at 
points outside of the state-space bounds of the Chebychev polynomial. As such, only the deterministic case 
is considered in this section. Note that this is a numerical, rather than conceptual, difficulty, and that 
certainty equivalent solutions are presented for all of the scenarios analyzed. 
16 Strong sustainability solutions for the social model are qualitatively similar, in that initial N1stocks below 
the social PV-optimal solution are built up to slightly less than the steady state level, while stocks greater 
than this level are maintained indefinitely.  
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17 Profits are monotonically increasing in nutrient stocks, and the non-negativity constraint on fertilizer 
application precludes controls which “waste” the physical nutrient stocks. 
18 This is again due to the “overshooting” of the PV steady state level of the active pool in the 
unconstrained problem. 
19 This corresponds to stock and control values of 
12 90.9, 31.2,  NN == 3.74, F = and   while the PV 
optimal values are 90.1, 30.9, and 3.69, respectively. PV optimal stock levels and fertilization at the steady 
state are declining in the discount rate. 
20 In that model, the single renewable resource was a direct source of utility. 
21 At relatively high levels of nutrient stocks with low levels of damage, future generations’ welfare, as 
represented by the value function at the end of period stocks, is relatively flat with respect to low levels of 
fertilization, though the numerical approximation is slightly downward sloping. It is unclear if this negative 
slope is due solely to the numerical algorithm, or if the slope of the true curve is zero. In any case, stepwise 
inefficiencies are frequent at stock levels less than the PV-optimal steady state. Interestingly, multiple 
Pareto-optima (and thus multiple optimal fertilization levels) can exist in cases when the current 
generations’ value function is positively sloped with respect to the control, but future generations’ function 
is negatively sloped. We follow the convention here that in such cases, the highest obtainable level of 
welfare for future generations is chosen (in other words, zero fertilization), as strict adherence to the 
sustainability criterion requires disposal of “excess” utility and equivalence of the welfare of subsequent 
generations. 
22 These figures assume disposal of any profits and/or utility arising from stepwise inefficiencies for any 
generation. 
23 Although not as extreme, this interpretation is similar to the Green Golden Rule solution to a dynamic 
resource problem in which one takes the limit as the discount rate tends to zero. 
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Table 1. Model Parameters for Simulation 
 
Biogeochemical Parameters    Yield Parameters 
α11 1.5   A  400
α12 0.122   b  0.030
α13 0.409   β0 0.166
αγ 0.500   β1 0.901
γ3 0.177   β2 0.244
E[γatm] 20    βF 0.817
Var[γatm] 25    Economic Parameters 
α21 0.089   p  1
α22 0.260   c  0.2
δ  0.100   d  0.02
η  0.183      
Note: Based on Baisden and Amundson (2003) for their 600x10
3 year old soil 





































































Figure 1. Selected simulated paths, private PV-optimal model as a function of time 




































































Figure 2. Selected simulated paths, social PV-optimal model as a function of time 
with internalized externality 
 


























































































Figure 4. Private PV-optimal and N1-sus value functions at steady state N2
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Figure 6. Selected simulated paths, private V-sus model as a function of time 






























































































Figure 8. Private PV-optimal and V-sus value functions at various N2 levels 
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Figure 9. Optimal fertilization and total N stocks for selected time periods with 










Figure 11. Welfare decomposition across time and sector (including stepwise 
inefficiencies) 
 
 
 
 